



Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado

Youth political participation: new survey data from Mozambique's three northern provinces

This is a *Policy Brief* summarizing a more comprehensive study on 'Leadership, Youth and Social Cohesion in Mozambique'

Summary

Overall, the data paint a picture of a Mozambican youth that is politically marginalised. Marginalised youth represents a ticking bomb under the Mozambican electorate. If mobilised, they could change the political landscape for good.

Results

Youth (18-24) make up one quarter of the Mozambican electorate. Born after 1994, their reality is different from that of their parents. They are literate and have access to information. They are educated, and they do not see the state as the only possible employer.

On 15 October, many of them will vote for the first time.

To learn more about the Mozambican youth, CDD commissioned a study on youth political participation in the three northern provinces (Nampula, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa).

The study draws on survey data collected in July 2019. 1,370 youth participated in the survey, meaning the data are representative at regional level with an error margin of +/- 3% poin-

ts and a 95% confidence level.

Overall, the data paint a picture of a Mozambican youth that is politically marginalised.

Although 83% say that youth must participate in the resolution of community problems, 60% say they do not feel free to speak their mind, 74% say they never or rarely participate in community meetings, and more than 80% say they never or rarely contact local leaders.

Asked about barriers to youth political participation, 64% point to education and information, while 23% point to opportunities. The remaining 13% point to courage.

Regression analysis reveals important socio-economic disparities. Employed youth, meaning youth with jobs and cash income, are more likely to say they feel free to speak their mind, are more likely to participate in community meetings, and are more likely to contact local leaders.

This pattern is consistent with Barrington Moore's 'no bourgeoisie, no democracy' argument,¹ suggesting that economic interests are the main drivers of democratic consolidation. When a tax-paying middle class demands representation, the elite will be forced to give concessions, which will eventually be extended to the lower classes.

Regression analysis also found that education has an effect, independent of employment. Educated youth are more likely to discuss politics in the family, are more likely to say that youth should participate in the resolution of community problems, and are more likely to point to opportunities as barriers to youth political participation.

- The findings have policy implications: First, education and job creation are not only economic imperatives but also crucial for democratic consolidation.
- Second, marginalised youth represents a ticking bomb under the Mozambican electorate. If mobilised, they could change the political landscape for good.

Methodological notes

The policy brief draws on survey data collected in July 2019.

Data were collected using an innovative platform, developed by Sauti in partnership with te-

chnology startup Source Code.

Respondents were randomly sampled from a database, containing more than 200,000 mobile phone numbers across all provinces.

Respondents received an SMS inviting them to participate in the survey. The invitation was accepted by entering a short code, which triggered a batter of question administered to them through USSD. Upon completing all questions, respondents received an SMS confirming their participation and including an airtime voucher worth MZN 10.

15,621 people started the survey, including 1,370 from the target group (youth in the three northern provinces). 1,242 respondents from the target group completed the survey, giving an overall completion rate of 91%.

The data contained minor biases. Boys and youth in Nampula were oversampled, while girls and youth in Cabo Delgado and Niassa were proportionately under sampled (see Table).

The biases were corrected using post-stratification weights. The weights were calculated using the 'svy' function of the 'survey' package for R.

The weighted data are representative at regional level with an error margin of +/- 3% points and a 95% confidence level.

The data were analysed using regression models (OLS and maximum likelihood estimations). Independent variables included gender, age, location, education, and employment. A 5% significance level was used throughout the analysis.

Table 1: Comparison of sample and population distributions

Variable	Group	Sample (%)	Population (%)	Over/under-sampling (% points)
Province	Nampula	76	59*	+17
	Cabo Delgado	12	23*	-11
	Niassa	12	18*	-6
Gender	Boys	69	48*	+21
	Girls	31	52*	-21
Age	15-19	50	55**	-5
	20-24	50	45**	+5

* Based on 2017 census data

** Based on 2007 census data projections

1B. Moore (1993) [first published in 1966]. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.

CDD

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


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